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1. Overview  
The global financial system has changed significantly since the 2007-08 financial crisis. Developing 
countries have seen a decline in their net financial flows due to the collapse of the international 
banking sector. This was further exacerbated by weak growth prospects in key emerging markets 
and low commodity prices from 2014-15. The decline was somewhat offset by higher non-resident 
portfolio inflows, which resulted from prolonged ultra-low interest rates in advanced economies 
and the ensuing “search or yield”. While countries in East and South Asia continue to be major 
recipients of global financial flows, they have also become major providers, particularly for other 
developing countries. Hence, South-South finance is a growing trend. Additionally, public financial 
flows, namely overseas development assistance and multilateral lending, have exhibited strong 
growth since 2007 further mitigating the decline in private flows. 
Against this backdrop, the report identifies six key challenges facing developing countries.  
Medium-term challenges 
1. Monetary policy normalisation in rich countries. Ongoing monetary policy transition in rich 
economies represents a key risk for developing countries. As central banks raise short-term 
interest rates in response to higher growth and inflation, there is a risk that institutional 
investors will rebalance their portfolios resulting in a sharp reversal of flows to developing 
countries. 
2. Debt sustainability. The collapse in cross-border bank lending that followed the financial crisis 
means that developing country borrowers have increasingly turned to international bond 
markets. This poses several challenges. Most bonds are denominated in foreign currencies, 
leaving borrowers exposed to exchange rate risk. The markets tend to be volatile and prone to 
destabilising sudden surges and exits. Finally, as weaker issuers have entered these markets, 
there are concerns that asset valuations do not reflect fundamentals. 
3. Commodity price fluctuations. The collapse in international commodity prices in 2014-15 
created winners and losers among developing countries with implications for financial flows. 
Net commodity exporters have seen reduced consumption, investment and external positions, 
which has exacerbated fiscal vulnerabilities and complicated macroeconomic policy. 
Long-term challenges 
4. Non-traditional financial services. As the international banking sector has strengthened 
following implementation of the Basel III Accord, there are concerns that risk is shifting to non-
traditional financial services. In particular, shadow banking and financial technology (“fintech”) 
services have grown dramatically in developing countries in recent years. While these services 
offer opportunities in terms of financial development and financial inclusion, they also introduce 
new vulnerabilities. 
5. South-South finance. While increased South–South connectivity has many theoretical benefits, 
it also poses challenges going forward. Since financial institutions in the South tend to be less 
tightly regulated than those in the North, the rise of the South as a provider of finance could 
increase risk within the global system. 
6. Misaligned incentives. The most fundamental long-term challenge for developing countries is 
aligning incentives in the global financial system with sustainable development. This will 
involve shifting the focus away from short-term profit maximisation and towards long-term 
value creation. However, there is no obvious policy solution for this problem. 
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2. Key trends 
Global financial flows 
Private flows 
Net private finance to developing countries has declined since the financial crisis.1 While net private 
flows to developing countries initially rebounded in 2008, they peaked at $615 billion in 2010 and 
slowed thereafter, turning negative from 2014 to 2016 (Figure 1). Such a prolonged reversal in the 
direction of global finance has not been seen since 1990 and was driven by weaker growth 
prospects in key emerging markets such as China, Russia and Brazil, low commodity prices and 
expectations of monetary tightening in advanced economies (UN/DESA, 2017: 76). The year 2017 
saw some alleviation in these conditions and a recovery in developing country inflows, according 
to the latest projections from the Institute of International Finance (IIF). Net financial inflows are 
estimated to have been $770 billion for 25 large emerging economies due to the somewhat 
improved global macroeconomic outlook (UN/DESA, 2018: 38).  
Figure 1: Net private financial flows to developing countries, 2007-16 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2017) in UN/DESA (2017: 77) 
The composition of private flows to developing countries has shifted away from cross-border bank 
finance and towards portfolio flows, particularly debt flows. Private financial flows have three main 
components: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio flows and other investment, which is 
primarily cross-border bank lending. Net FDI to developing countries has remained relatively stable 
since 2007 (Figure 2). However, bank finance (captured by “other investment”) has declined 
steeply and was the main contributor to the overall slump in private flows to developing countries. 
International banks, particularly in Europe, reduced their cross-border lending significantly after 
the financial crisis due to deleveraging pressures (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 7). By contrast, net 
portfolio flows to developing countries increased between 2008 and 2014 in response to the 
                                                 
1 “Developing countries” refers to all developing economies and economies in transition in the UN’s country 
classification, unless otherwise stated. Regional country groupings reference in the report are also based on the 
UN classification. 
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unconventional monetary policies adopted by rich countries. Ultra-low interest rates and extensive 
asset purchasing programmes (quantitative easing) depressed yields in advanced economies 
prompting investors to adjust their portfolios to include more “high-risk high-yield” assets, 
particularly emerging market bonds (UN/DESA, 2017: 89). Following a dip in 2015-16, portfolio 
inflows to developing countries rebounded strongly last year as loose monetary policies in rich 
countries persisted and growth projections in key emerging economies improved (UN/DESA, 2017: 
41).2 Thus, the post-crisis period has been characterised by a change in the external debt 
composition of developing countries, with bond markets replacing bank loans as a key source of 
finance (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 16). 
Figure 2: Net private financial flows to developing countries by type, 2007-16 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2017) 
Retrieved: UN/DESA (2017: 77) 
The major recipients of international private finance have changed little. Data on gross financial 
inflows by geography is only readily available for FDI. The proportion of global FDI channelled to 
developing countries (excluding transition economies) grew moderately between 2007 and 2016, 
increasing by 9 percentage points (Figure 3). This trend was driven by East and South Asia, which 
continued to rival Europe as the largest destination for global FDI inflows and increased its share 
over the period (Figure 4). FDI inflows to Latin America were approximately one-third of those to 
East and South Asia and declined slightly in recent years due to lower commodity prices and weak 
economic activity in the largest economies (UN/DESA, 2018: 42). Africa remained the least popular 
destination for FDI, consistently attracting less than 5.5 percent of global inflows.  
                                                 
2 The steep decline in net portfolio flows to developing countries in 2015-16 was driven by record high capital 
outflows from China. The outflows were caused by China’s weakening growth prospects and an expected interest 
rate rise in the US (Reuters, 2015). In fact, the overall trend in net private financial flows to developing countries 
depicted in Figure 2 is driven by dynamics in East and South Asia, which is both the largest recipient and provider 
of finance among developing regions. Other regions experienced positive net financial flows in 2016 (UN/DESA, 
2017: 78).  
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Figure 3: Gross FDI inflows to developing, transition and developed economies, 2007-16 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
Figure 4: Gross FDI inflows by region, 2007-16 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
By contrast, the major providers of international private finance have shifted as South-South 
finance has increased. While the distribution of global FDI inflows has remained relatively 
unchanged, the distribution of outflows has shifted dramatically. Developing countries (excluding 
transition economies) contributed just 13 percent of FDI in 2007 (Figure 5). This figure more than 
doubled in the decade following the financial crisis, peaking at 40 percent in 2014. East and South 
Asia drove this trend due to a surge in outward investment from China, which became the second 
largest source of FDI in 2016 after the US (UNCTAD, 2017: 14) (Figure 6). Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were also among the top 20 providers of FDI in 2016 (UNCTAD, 
2017: 14). Much of this developing country investment is directed towards South-South ventures, 
such as China’s One Belt One Road initiative (UNCTAD, 2017: 89). In particular, developing 
economies are an increasingly important source of capital for least developed countries (LDCs), 
which have traditionally been excluded from global financial markets: 
In recent years, an upswing has been recorded in investment to LDCs from other 
developing economies, including China, South Africa and Turkey… In 2015 (the latest year 
for which complete data were available), multinational enterprises from developing 
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economies, especially from Asia (including, in addition to the traditional top ones, Thailand) 
and from countries in transition (especially the Russian Federation) accounted for the bulk 
of the inward FDI stock in LDCs. In terms of stock, China has widened its lead as the 
number one investor in these countries (UNCTAD, 2017: 89). 
The rise of the South-South FDI is part of a broader trend involving different types of cross-border finance. In an 
unpublished paper, Broner and others (2017) use bilateral data on international investments to show that the 
South has captured an increasingly sizable share of global portfolio and bank lending flows, as well as FDI (IBRD/ 
World Bank, 2018: 93). Between 2001 and 2012-14 the share of South-South flows increased from 8 to 12 
percent for FDI, 0.9 to 3.3 percent for portfolio investment and 5 to 8 percent for cross-border bank claims 
(IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 87-93). 
Figure 5: Gross FDI outflows from developing, transition and developed economies, 2007-16 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
Figure 6: Gross FDI outflows by region, 2007-16 
  
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
Public flows 
International public finance to developing countries has grown since the financial crisis, continuing 
a long-term trend that began with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000. There are 
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two main types of international public finance: overseas development assistance (ODA) and 
lending by multilateral development banks (MDBs). Total ODA disbursements have increased by 
51 percent in real terms since 2007, reaching $177.6 billion in 2017 (OECD, 2018). While the large 
majority of this aid is provided by members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), ODA disbursements by non-DAC reporting countries nearly doubled during the period, 
reaching $15.2 billion (OECD, 2018). The OECD estimates that non-DAC, non-reporting countries 
disburse a further $6.9 billion annually, suggesting that South-South development cooperation 
surpassed $20 billion in 2017 (OECD, 2018). Annual disbursements of non-grant subsidised 
finance by seven key MDBs reached $65.8 billion in 2016, a real increase of 73 percent since 2007 
(UN/DESA, 2018: 46). MDBs’ commitments in 2016 were significantly higher at $84.9 billion, 
suggesting that a further increase in disbursements is likely in 2017 (UN/DESA, 2018: 46). 
However, international public flows remain insufficient to fill the financing gap for public investment 
in developing countries, particularly LDCs. UN/DESA (2018: 45) highlights three concerns about 
the sufficiency of ODA flows. First, as a share of gross national income of donor countries, ODA is 
0.32 percent, significantly below the UN target of 0.7 percent. Second, the share of ODA received 
by LDCs has fallen since the financial crisis from 30 to 24 percent. This is a problem because 
LDCs rely on ODA (which makes up two thirds of their external finance on average) to fund public 
expenditure. Despite a commitment to halt the decline in the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
(AAAA), the share of aid to LDCs fell year-on-year in 2016. Finally, much of the increase in ODA 
disbursements in recent years was driven by higher expenditure on in-donor refugees and 
humanitarian aid, rather than long-term development programming. Regarding MDBs, the AAAA 
placed significant emphasis on their role in funding the 2030 Agenda/ Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). However, the Center for Global Development’s High Level Panel on the Future of 
Multilateral Banking highlighted a number of concerns about the adequacy of MDB finance: 
[MDBs’] portfolio of cross-border loans is tiny in relation to needs, particularly for regional 
infrastructure where there is greater complexity in negotiating an allocation of debt service 
among borrowers. And they rarely exploit the full range of instruments they have—grants, 
equity, guarantees, and policy leverage—to crowd in sustainable private investment, [but] 
rely predominantly on lending to sovereigns. (Birdsall & Morris, 2016: 3) 
Moreover, most MDBs are leveraged at close to their operational limits, meaning their capacity to 
increase lending is constrained (UN/DESA, 2017: 94). 
Global financial architecture 
Efforts to reform the global financial architecture have centred on strengthening the banking sector 
(UN/DESA, 2018: 79). International standards for baking regulation are established by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), with guidance from the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
(UN, 2017: 9).3 BCSB’s response to the financial crisis was to agree a new framework for banking 
regulation in 2010-11, Basel III. Key elements of the Basel III framework include strengthened 
minimum capital requirements, the introduction of liquidity requirements and improved risk 
management standards (UN/DESA, 2018: 79; Danielsson, 2013: 348). Additionally, the framework 
                                                 
3 The BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established by the central bank governors 
of the G-10 countries in the late 1960s. The Financial Stability Board is an international body established by the 
G20 summit in 2009 with a mandate to monitor the global financial system and work with standard setting bodies 
to design and implement reform (Danielsson, 2013). 
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aims to address the “too-big-to-fail” problem by requiring jurisdictions to establish viable resolution 
frameworks for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Most national jurisdictions have now 
adopted the core Basel III elements (UN, 2017: 9). Consequently, capital ratios and liquidity 
indicators in G-SIBs and other banks have risen considerably and most economists agree that 
their balance sheets are much improved (UN/DESA, 2018: 79). However, progress has been 
slower in implementing policies designed to solve “too-big-to-fail”, undermining supervisors’ ability 
to wind-up failing large banks rather than bail them out (UN, 2017: 9).  
Other important changes to the global financial architecture include the expansion of safety nets, 
regulation of derivatives trading and reform of credit rating agencies. An agreed international 
approach to sovereign debt distress remains a gap. The international financial safety net is a 
network of institutions that provide liquidity to countries in times of financial stress. It comprises 
multilateral lending facilities operated by the IMF at a global level, along with regional facilities and 
bilateral lines of credit. The safety net has grown significantly since 2007. The three largest regional 
facilities (the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization for ASEAN+3 countries, the North American 
Framework Agreement and the European Stability Mechanism) were valued at $1.22 trillion in 
2015, while the volume of IMF resources was expanded in January 2016 (UN, 2017: 5-6). Other 
important reforms agreed by the FSB relate to the previously unregulated derivatives trade, which 
dramatically increased leverage in the financial system before 2007. These include trade reporting 
requirements, central clearing and platform trading arrangements and new margin rules for non-
centrally cleared derivatives (UN, 2017: 10). Finally, the FSB set out a roadmap to reduce 
mechanistic reliance on credit rating agencies in 2012. The purpose of the roadmap was to reduce 
the agencies’ disproportional influence on financial flows and it has largely been successful in this 
regard (UN, 2017: 13). One area in which there has been insufficient international cooperation, 
however, is responding to debt distress. While the importance of providing “breathing space” to a 
sovereign entering debt distress has been highlighted in the international policy debate, progress 
in developing global consensus on guidelines for debtor and creditor responsibilities has been 
limited (UN, 2017: 8). 
Reform of international public financial institutions has focused on increasing collaboration with the 
private sector to mobilise funding for the SDGs. More recently, some MDBs have also called for 
capital increases. In 2016, the World Bank Group conducted a “forward look” exercise in order to 
identify which changes to its current practice were required to best support the 2030 agenda. A 
key outcome of this exercise was the “Cascade” approach to targeting resources. Under this 
approach, the World Bank Group will seek to mobilize commercial finance wherever possible 
during its programming. Only where market solutions are not possible will official and public 
resources be applied (UN, 2017: 13). Other MDBs are also working together to engage the private 
sector in their projects. In 2016, nine MDBs produced a set of principles for crowding-in commercial 
finance for sustainable development with the aim of increasing overall private sector mobilization 
by 25-35 percent within three years (UN, 2017: 14). However, some MDBs have argued that 
progress on the 2030 Agenda will require significant capital increases. The World Bank Group, 
which last had a capital increase in 2010, has warned that the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation will have to shrink 
their operations unless an increase is agreed. The African Development Bank has also called for 
more capital (UN, 2017: 14). 
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3. Challenges and risks for developing countries 
Medium-term  
Monetary policy normalisation in rich countries 
Ongoing monetary policy transition in the US and the expectation of similar adjustment in other 
major economies represent a key risk for developing countries. As central banks raise short-term 
interest rates and shrink their balance sheets, there is a risk that institutional investors will 
rebalance their portfolios, pushing up risk and term premia and lowering the value of risky assets 
(IMF, 2018: 5). This could lead to rising financing costs and sharp reversals of portfolio flows in 
developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones. As discussed in Section 2, portfolio 
flows have become an increasingly important source of external finance for the Global South 
following the collapse in cross-border bank lending after the financial crisis. Their withdrawal could 
lead to significant financial instability, including currency depreciation and increased balance sheet 
fragilities, which usually accompany large capital outflows (UN/DESA, 2018: 70). Moreover, a 
change in investors’ expectations of future monetary policy, triggered for example by increased 
uncertainty about inflation, could also lead to heighted volatility in portfolio flows with the same 
result (UN/DESA, 2018: 40). 
However, the likelihood of monetary policy normalisation triggering financial turmoil has declined 
somewhat, according to analysis by the IMF (IMF, 2018: 5-8). Financial markets have adjusted 
relatively smoothly to monetary tightening thus far, attributable to central banks’ gradual pace of 
change and clear communications, which have prevented sudden portfolio adjustments. 
Additionally, the majority of large emerging economies are better placed to manage tighter 
international funding conditions. They have greater exchange rate flexibility, higher levels of 
international reserves and, in some cases, improved macroeconomic management than before 
the crisis (UN/DESA: 79). Nevertheless, the IMF recommends that developing countries adopt the 
following mitigating measures to build resilience and reduce the likelihood of outflows during 
monetary policy normalisation (IMF, 2018: 29-30): 
• Maintain sound macroeconomic, structural, financial and macroprudential policies, taking 
into account the country’s individual cyclical position, balance sheet vulnerabilities and 
policy space. 
• Build appropriate buffers that can be used during stress. In particular, increase 
international reserves to support exchange rate regimes during periods of outflow pressure 
or take steps toward making the exchange rate regime more flexible where appropriate. 
• Monitor firms’ foreign exchange exposures and ensure their capacity to absorb exchange 
rate risks. 
• If external financial conditions deteriorate sharply, implement an appropriate 
macroeconomic and financial policy response to combat outflow pressures before 
considering capital controls. Capital controls should only be implemented in crisis 
situations or when a crisis is considered imminent, and should be transparent, temporary, 
and non-discriminatory and should be lifted once crisis conditions abate. 
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Debt sustainability 
Facilitated by large search-for-yield flows, developing country borrowers have increasingly been 
able to access international financial markets, particularly bond markets (see Section 2). 
Cumulative bond issuance increased from 4.3 percent of GDP in the six pre-crisis years to 6.7 
percent of GDP in the six post-crisis years for the median developing country. At the same time, 
bond-fund allocations from developed markets to developing countries almost quadrupled between 
2009 and 2015, reaching $385 billion (Feyen, 2015). The changing composition of external debt 
in developing countries poses several challenges.  
First, most sovereign and corporate bonds are denominated in foreign currencies, leaving 
borrowers exposed to exchange rate risk (UN/DESA, 2018: 33). For example, if a country has 
significant levels of dollar-denominated debt, a real appreciation in the dollar (perhaps resulting 
from further monetary policy normalisation in the US) would raise the cost of servicing and repaying 
that debt.  
Second, portfolio debt flows have shorter maturities and tend to be more volatile than cross-border 
bank lending, leading to interest rate and rollover risk (UN/DESA, 2017: 102). The increase in 
portfolio lending to developing countries has coincided with a rise in their stock of short-term debt. 
The share of short-term debt in countries’ total external debt rose from 25 percent in 2007 to 33 
percent in 2014 (UN/DESA, 2017: 102). At the same time, analysis of high frequency data on 
capital flows in selected developing countries since 2005 has shown that portfolio flows are 
particularly vulnerable to periodic episodes of high volatility (UN, 2017: 2). Borrowing short to 
finance ventures in which the return is often realised in the long-term is risky, particularly when the 
credit flow is unpredictable (Danielsson, 2013). A sudden withdrawal of credit (perhaps due to a 
risk aversion episode) means borrowers cannot rollover their debt by borrowing more. This can 
lead to liquidity problems if they are also unable to monetise their assets to repay what they owe. 
Finally, there are concerns that portfolio investors, while seeking higher yields, have extended too 
much credit to risky, unproductive ventures (IMF, 2018: xii). In particular, there has been a 
significant rise in lending to corporations in emerging economies, including China, which does not 
appear to be based on fundamentals. Corporate debt in these countries rose from $7.6 trillion in 
2008 to $24.5 trillion in the first quarter of 2016 (UN/DESA, 2017: 89). Much of this was channelled 
to sectors with an ambiguous impact on long-term productivity and growth, such as real estate 
companies. If corporate profitability deteriorates in conjunction with the accumulation of debt, 
balance sheets become increasingly fragile. Indeed, there has been a rise in default rates among 
firms in some emerging markets, notably in Latin America, due to these dynamics (UN/DESA, 
2017: 33). Balance sheet fragility could result in a disorderly deleveraging process with adverse 
spillovers on banks and real private sector activity.  
The likelihood of developing country debt becoming unsustainable is increasing. The IMF’s Global 
Financial Stability Report (2018: 28) finds:  
Gross issuance of foreign currency corporate and sovereign debt securities rose to new 
highs in 2017, allowing even weaker issuers to access markets. The share of non-
investment-grade issuance has risen to more than 40 percent, boosted by the return to 
bond markets of issuers such as Egypt and smaller issuers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, exposure to less committed, potentially “flighty,” investors is growing, which 
makes countries susceptible to a reversal in capital flows… and rollover risks.  
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To ensure a sustainable debt burden, the IMF (2018: 32) recommends that policymakers in 
developing countries reduce vulnerabilities related to the structure of their debt and attract a stable 
investor base. Developing local bond markets is one mechanism by which to do this, since 
domestic portfolio investors tend to exhibit less volatile behaviour than foreign ones (UN/DESA, 
2017: 84). However, creditors must also play a role. Official creditors should emphasise timely 
resolution of external debt distress cases to avoid potential spillovers and minimise costs for both 
the issuer and creditors. This may require facilitating institutional coordination when the set of 
lenders is diverse. New official creditors should consider adopting sustainable lending rules, such 
as those endorsed by the G20 (IMF, 2018: 32). 
Commodity price fluctuations 
International commodity price movements pose a risk to financial stability in many developing 
countries. In late 2014 and in 2015, most commodity prices dropped sharply form the high levels 
reached in the boom period of 2011 to 2013. The year 2016 saw some recovery in certain sectors, 
but this upward trend largely came to a halt in 2017 and commodity prices remain significantly 
lower than at the peak of the last commodity boom (UN/DESA, 2018: 34-5). The decline has 
created winners and losers among developing countries with implications for financial flows. Net 
commodity importers have seen increased consumption, investment and external positions, while 
the opposite holds true for net exporters (Feyen, 2015). This has complicated macroeconomic 
policy in the latter group of countries. Many commodity exporters have introduced pro-cyclical 
interest rate rises to stem capital outflows and mitigate currency depreciation, at the expense of 
higher borrowing costs that weigh on domestic activity (UN/DESA: 2017: 34). A renewed downturn 
in commodity prices could exacerbate vulnerabilities in these countries, restrict their policy space 
further and ultimately impact their capacity for stable growth (UN/DESA, 2018: 71-4). 
Commodity prices are likely to remain low and volatile in the medium-term, according to analysis 
by UN/DESA (2018: 34-5). The key policy implication for countries that remain heavily dependent 
on a few basic commodities is to pursue economic diversification (UN/DESA, 2018: 74). Expanding 
less volatile sectors of the economy should also be accompanied by fiscal reforms to restructure 
and broaden the revenue base in order to reduce fiscal dependency on short-term commodity 
revenue. The planned introduction of a 5 percent value-added tax in the Cooperation Council for 
the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) countries is a recent example of such fiscal reforms. The tax 
was implemented in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in January 2018 and will be rolled 
out to other GCC states in order to reduce their fiscal dependency on oil revenue (UN/DESA, 2018: 
128). 
Long-term 
Non-traditional financial services 
Economists largely agree that the international banking sector has strengthened since the financial 
crisis due to widespread implementation of the Basel III framework (see Section 2). However, there 
are concerns that financial stability risk has now shifted from the banking sector to non-traditional 
financial institutions, which typically face fewer regulations. Two types of non-traditional finance 
have received particular attention in the context of developing countries: shadow banking and 
fintech. 
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Shadow banking is a loose term that generally refers to bank-like institutions and practices that 
exist outside the regulated banking sector (Danielsson, 2013: 332). There are many ways to 
provide financing outside of traditional banking channels. Structured finance and securitisation, for 
example, raise financing indirectly through the capital markets using special purpose entities such 
as asset-backed commercial paper conduits and structured investment vehicles (Schwarcz, 2016: 
2). Shadow banking has grown rapidly in several emerging economies in recent years. According 
to some estimates, it represents up to 35-40 percent of the financial sector in some East Asian 
countries (UN/DESA, 2018: 79). In China, the shadow banking sector is estimated to be worth 
RMB 75 trillion (90 percent of GDP) and to have played a critical role in the country’s historic credit 
boom (IMF, 2018: 32). While the types of risk that shadow banking institutions face are similar to 
those faced by traditional banks, the level of risk they can take on is greater because they are 
subject to less regulatory oversight. The FSB estimates that the growth of shadow banking has 
been accompanied by a relatively high degree of credit risk, as well as liquidity and maturity 
transformation and, in some countries, relatively high levels of leverage (UN, 2017: 10). To the 
extent that domestic and foreign firms, both financial and non-financial, are exposed to the shadow-
banking sector, this heightened risk has the potential to spill over into traditional banking and the 
real economy. 
Fintech refers to technology-driven new companies that provide financial services outside the 
traditional financial sector (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 17). These services include, inter alia, 
alternative online lending platforms (so called peer-to-peer platforms), digital payment and transfer 
services and mobile banking. Global investment in fintech companies has expanded rapidly 
worldwide and there were at least 4000 active fintech firms in 2015 (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 17). 
Fintech has received considerable interest from developing country policymakers since it holds the 
promise of increasing access to finance for market segments that have traditionally been 
underserved, particularly low-income individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises. Despite 
this potential, fintech also brings new vulnerabilities to the financial sector. Providers tend to have 
fewer safety nets in their business models. For example, peer-to-peer online lending platforms, 
which match borrowers and investors for a fee, do not hold the loans originated in their balance 
sheets. Therefore, although they do not bear the default risk, the profitability of their businesses is 
highly dependent on the number of loans they intermediate and may evaporate during an economic 
downturn, whereas banks covered by implicit and explicit deposit insurance schemes are better 
equipped to cope (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 114-5). Other risks associated with fintech include 
misuse of personal data, discriminatory customer profiling systems, electronic fraud and the 
potential of new technology to support illegal activities such as illicit transfers (IBRD/ World Bank, 
2018: 18).  
South-South finance 
Southern economies have increased their role as providers of finance since the financial crisis (see 
Section 2). This trend has various theoretical benefits. First, South–South connectivity is likely to 
promote Southern economies’ financial development through increased funding source 
diversification, improved access to a wider range of investment projects, technology spillovers and 
more competition (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 96). Second, it may enhance financial inclusion at the 
country, firm and individual level. There is evidence that South-South FDI is frequently channelled 
to LDCs, which have traditionally been excluded from Northern financial markets (see Section 2). 
Equally, South-South banking may improve access to financial services for SMEs and households 
in developing countries: 
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Relative to an [international] bank from the North, Southern [international] banks invest in 
countries within their region and tend to be more familiar with the cultural, linguistic, legal, 
and institutional environment of the host country and may be better at collecting and 
processing soft information that allows them to overcome the common challenges that 
foreign banks face when lending downmarket to smaller and more informationally opaque 
segments, especially SMEs and households. (IBRD/ World Bank, 2018: 14-5)  
However, South-South finance also poses new challenges in the longer term, particularly in the 
banking sector. Increasing regionalisation of banking in the South may limit risk-sharing, which 
would increase developing countries’ exposure to regional shocks and cause foreign shocks to 
spread more quickly through a region (IBRD/World Bank, 2018: 96). Moreover, since financial 
institutions in the South tend to be less tightly regulated than those in the North, the rise of the 
South as a provider of cross-border lending could negatively affect the stability of the overall 
financial system. For example, research has found that foreign banks based in countries with 
relatively lax regulatory requirements can amplify credit booms in borrower countries with 
destabilising effects, since policymakers in the latter have little power to regulate their activities 
(IBRD/World Bank, 2018: 15). Regarding South-South FDI, there are concerns about the quality 
of this investment and thus its developmental impact. In particular, FDI to LDCs remains highly 
concentrated in extractive industries and the number of greenfield projects has fallen in recent 
years (UN/DESA, 2017: 79).  
Misaligned incentives 
Closing the investment gap to meet the SDGs by 2030 requires the mobilisation of significant 
financial resources. The AAAA recognises that the global financial system is critical for achieving 
this. However, the system currently does not allocate enough resources towards long-term 
sustainable development, with significant gaps in areas such as infrastructure, healthcare, 
education and renewable energies (UN/DESA, 2018: 80). Therefore, aligning the international 
financial system’s incentives towards long-term investments that are consistent with sustainable 
development is a key issue moving forward. This will require a fundamental shift away from the 
current focus on short-term profits, which is reflected in volatile financial flows and reinforced by 
numerous practices such as quarterly financial reporting by firms, monthly benchmarks for 
performance and mark-to-market accounting (UN/DESA, 2018: 80). Achieving such a shift is 
extremely challenging with no obvious policy solution. 
The ongoing reforms of the global financial architecture represent a significant opportunity to adjust 
incentives within the system. One promising effort is the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures, which was set up in April 2015 under the FSB with the objective of promoting 
environmental sustainability through financial governance. However, efforts to integrate 
sustainable development into the reform agenda are still in their infancy (UN, 2017: 11). Moreover, 
data and evidence on the impacts of financial regulatory reform on developing countries is lacking 
(UN, 2017: 11). 
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